Introduction: History, the Matter of Science
It is the mathematical and experimental sciences, rather than natural history, that are usually seen in connection with Francis Bacon's methodological reform of science, in particular, and the Scientifi c Revolution in general. It is universally agreed, of course, that natural history underwent a rapid development during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, due to the large numbers of exotic plants and animals that became known to European scholars in the wake of long-distance trade and colonial exploration. But this development is generally seen as the result of mere fact gathering, conducive to but not constitutive of what we consider to be 'modern' science. Even those few scholars who have been eager to point out the importance of natural history for the Scientifi c Revolution have tended to reproduce its modern image as a merely empirical, cumulative enterprise that prepared the way towards more theoretically oriented sciences like chemistry and biology.
1
To some extent, this image of natural history was also shared by those who emphasized the importance of natural history in the seventeenth century. In his De augmentis scientiarum (1623), Francis Bacon distinguished two kinds of natural history, 'narrative' and 'inductive', maintaining that the former was 'far inferior in importance' to the latter. The basis for this judgement lay in Bacon's conviction that 'the noblest end of Natural History is to minister and be in order for the Foundations of Philosophy'. 'Narrative' natural history did not serve this end. It was pursued 'for the sake of the knowledge of the things themselves'. The usefulness of 'narrative' natural history, in other words, was determined intrinsically, solely by the 'pleasure' or 'profi t' that its subjects held for the reader, and not by any extrinsic value it had in store for natural philosophy. 'Inductive' natural history, by contrast, was defi ned precisely by its ability to provide the means to the ends of natural philosophy. As Bacon expressed it, 'inductive' natural history 'is the stuff and material of a solid and lawful Induction, and may be called the nursing mother of philosophy'. Bacon's distinction of 'narrative' and 'inductive' natural history is interesting, because it shows that he did not believe that the foundations of the new science could be laid through the mere accumulation of particulars. Pursued for its own sake, natural history was more or less worthless. To 'minister and be in order for' natural philosophy, natural history had to give its statements a certain form and a certain order. In a well-known passage of the Novum Organum (1620), Bacon compares those who 'only collect and use' to ants, and mere 'reasoners' to spiders, 'who make their cobwebs out of their own substance'. The middle course he recommended was that of the bee which 'gathers its material [and] transforms and digests it'.
3 And in an even more telling metaphor, he compared the state of contemporary, that is mainly 'narrative', natural history with a 'kingdom or state [which] were to direct its counsels and affairs, not by letters and reports from ambassadors and trustworthy messengers, but by the gossip of the street'.
4
The latter metaphor is so telling, because it calls attention to the fact that Baconian induction involved the ordering of experiences in written form. 'Natural and experimental history is so various and diffuse', Bacon maintained in the Novum Organum, 'that it confounds and distracts the understanding unless it be ranged and presented to view in a suitable order. We must therefore form Tables and Arrangements of Instances, in such a method and order that the understanding may be able to deal with them'. 5 In light of these statements, Bacon's obsession with the classifi cation of 'instances', as well as with different forms of tabulating such instances, which is so conspicuous in the various 'histories' he compiled for the planned third part of his Instauratio magna
